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Granny Snatching and Personal JurisdictionAn Argument for a New Federal Interpleader
Brittany Griffin Smith'
INTRODUCTION

estimated 5.4 million Americans now suffer from Alzheimer's
disease,' at a time when families are simultaneously becoming
increasingly geographically dispersed and mobile.3 More adult children are
finding themselves in the role of "parents" to aging mothers and fathers
with hundreds of miles between them and their relatives. This change in
American family life has brought new challenges to state courts, such as
when more than one person applies for guardianship of the same person
in different jurisdictions. The aging relative may not be able to testify, the
courts may not be able to access evidence in other states, and even if one
state declares a guardian, other states may not give that adjudication full
faith and credit.4
Of particular concern, however, is when relatives living in different states
take advantage of traditional rules for personal jurisdiction by removing the
incapacitated adult from his or her home to adjudicate the guardianship
proceeding outside the prying eyes of other relatives. The typical scenario
that frustrates the state courts, referred to as "granny snatching,"5 occurs
AN

I Juris Doctor, May 2012, University of Kentucky College of Law; BA (2005) and M.A.

(zoo6), University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank Professors Scott Bauries and
Nicole Huberfeld for their assistance with this project. This Note would not have been possible without their insight.
2 William Thies & Laura Bleiler, 2011 Alzheimer's DiseaseFacts andFigures,7 ALZHEIMER'S
& DEMENTIA: J. ALZHEIMER'S Ass'N 208, 215 (zoi I), available at http://download.journals.elsevierhealth.com/pdfs/journals/i 5 52-526o/PIlS 1552526o I000367.pdf.

3 See COMM. L. &AGING AM. BAR.ASS'N, STATE ADULT GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION: DIRECTIONS OF REFORM -2010 I (zoio), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategorized/2o 11/201 iaging.gshipelss_o20o.authcheckdam.pdf.
4 See UNIF. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS JURISDICTION ACT prefatory note, availableat http://www.guardianship.org/spotlight/UAGPPJA.Final-Deco7.pdf.
5 See, e.g., Julia B. Meister, Guardians, Granny Snatching, and Geography: Recent Ohio Supreme Court GuardianshipDecisions andthe UniformAdult Guardianshipand ProtectiveProceedings
JurisdictionAct (UAGPPJA), 19 PROS. L.J. OHIo 177 (zoos); Donna S. Harkness, Now That We've
Got It,
What Does It Dofor US?: The Uniform GuardianshipandProtectiveProceedingsJurisdiction
Act, TENN. B. J., Dec. 2011, at 25,26 ("The most dramatic arise out of incidents involving what
has been termed 'granny snatching,' where an older person is involuntarily transported across
slate lines for purposes of obtaining a guardianship or conservatorship as part of a family feud
over caregiving." (emphasis added)).
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when one aging adult visits his or her child in a different state, or that child
visits the parent in the parent's home state, and then moves the parent to
the child's home state, often with the purpose of financially exploiting the
parent.6 Once in the child's home state, the child seeks guardianship over
the parent.7 In effect, the child deprives the parent of adjudication in the
state with access to the best evidence and uses in personam jurisdiction in
the child's state to gain control over the parent and, through the powers
bestowed on the guardian, the parent's assets.'
The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
responded to this problem by drafting the Uniform Adult Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (UAGPPJA). 9 Jurisdiction over the
incapacitated adult can only be exercised in two cases: (1) if the state is the
adult's "home state," where the individual has been present for at least six
months, or (2) if the adult has a "specific connection" to the state, meaning
some connection other than just mere presence. 0 The "home state" has
preference over the "specific-connection state,"' and states can cooperate
in the proceedings so that the best evidence is maintained."2 A state court
can decline to exercise jurisdiction if it deems it to be inequitable under
the circumstances. 3 The UAGPPJA also allows for sanctions if any party
engages in wrongful conduct in obtaining jurisdiction. 4 If guardianship is
granted, it allows the new guardian to register in other state courts to insure
the court's ruling is given full faith and credit.'
But not all states have adopted the UAGPPJA. As of spring 2012, thirty
states and the District of Columbia have done so. 16 Until all states adopt
6 See Kerry Peck, Uniform Adult Guardianshipand Protective ProceedingsJurisdiction Act,
CBA REC., Feb.-Mar. 201o,at 36, 36.

7 See id.
8 See A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where is the ConstitutionalCrisiswith ProceduralSafeguards andDue Process in GuardianshipAdjudication?,7 ELDER L.J. 33, 37-38 (1999).
9 UNIF. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS JURISDICTION ACT §§
101-505 (2007), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Adult%2oGuardianship%2oand%2oProtective%2oProceedings%zoJurisdiction%2oAct.
io Id. § 203. For example, the incapacitated adult may be without a home state.
In that case, a state with which the incapacitated adult has a specific connection, such as
buying a home, would have jurisdiction. See Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings
Jurisdiction Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSON, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Adult%2oGuardianship%2oand%zoProtective%2oProceedings%2oJurisdiction%2oAct (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
II See id.§§ 203 cmt., 2oI(a)(3).
12 Seeid.§§ 1o4-io5.
13 See id. § 207(a)(i).
14 Ste id. § 207(b).
15 Seeid.§ 4O,4O3 .

I6 See Uniform Adult Guardianshipand Protective ProceedingsJurisdictionAct, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Adult%2oGuardianship%2oand%2o
Protective%zoProceedings%2oJurisdiction%aoAct (last visited Mar. 5,2012 ).
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this Act and apply its provisions uniformly, granny snatching will persist as
states without the Act offer-to borrow a layman's favorite-a "loophole"
for would-be snatchers. Surely if someone were devious enough to consider
removing a defenseless relative from his or her home just to seize control
of his or her assets, he or she would also be capable of shopping for a forum
without the protection of the UAGPPJA.
Therefore, the better answer does not involve the states. This note will
explore another option-the passage of a new statutory interpleader, much
like 28 U.S.C. § 1335, that adopts the UAGPPJA's definitions of "personal
jurisdiction." In a § 1335 interpleader, one defendant forces several
plaintiffs to try their claims in a single action. In this action, one res," which
is the subject of dispute by several interested parties but which cannot
be divided amongst them all, is placed in the protection of the court. All
parties are forced to litigate over who should receive the res. In a similar
manner, the incapacitated person and his or her assets could be placed in
the protection of the court while the family litigates over who would be the
best guardian.
Part I of the note explains the gritty details of granny snatching
by discussing infamous cases where state courts wrestled to protect
incapacitated adults from their children's ill intentions. If the reader still
doubts the dramatic effect this problem has on modern American families,
consider the unanswered questions at the end of Part I.
Part II will explain why state action has so far been inadequate to address
the problems identified in Part I. If the UAGPPJA were adopted in every
state and applied uniformly, the necessity of a federal interpleader would
wane. However, because the solution in the UAGPPJA uses procedural law,
and because the granny-snatching scenario arises only when people are
moved between states, the UAGPPJA simply cannot solve this problem
unless all states adopt it. If someone were devious enough to snatch a
relative from his or her home so as to exploit his or her assets, then surely
that same person would not be beyond forum shopping for a state without
strict jurisdictional rules.
Part III will illustrate how a statutory interpleader could resolve this
dilemma. Congress could use its powers over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to create a diversity-based jurisdictional statute. It could borrow the
language of the current statutory interpleader 8 to bring all interested parties
into federal court and enjoin them from bringing the case concurrently in
state court. 19 Families could use this statute to prevent parties from forum
i7 Res can refer to something intangible, as is the case in the doctrine of rcs judicata, or
it can refer to tangible property, such as matrimonial res. In each of these circumstances, res
refers to something of value.
18 See 28 U.S.C. § i335 (2oo6).
19 See, e.g., Holcornb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 228 F.2d 75, 79-80 (ioth Cir. I956); see 28

U.S.C. § 2361 (2oo6).
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shopping and, after using the nationwide service of process available under
the interpleader statute, ° bring the action in the state that meets the
definition for personal jurisdiction (as borrowed from the UAGPPJA) over
the incapacitated person. This should not circumvent any state powers, as
the federal courts would apply the substantive law of the forum state.2"
Ultimately, this Note's goal is to offer a preventive tool for families of
incapacitated persons who suspect one member of ill intentions. To be clear,
this Note is not meant to discourage states from adopting the UAGPPJA.
However, the focus of the Note is to offer a uniform procedural remedy for
families in the event states languish on adopting the Act, or if several states
interpret these provisions in divergent ways."2 Granny snatching can and
will continue so long as one or more states open its courts for would-be
snatchers.
While states have approaches outside the UAGPPJA to protect
incapacitated persons, they are inadequate in preventing granny snatchers.
These approaches usually involve re-examining intrastate procedural law,
which completely ignores the fact that this is an interstate problem that
states, acting alone, are not equipped to handle. Meanwhile, innocent
people must rely on already burdened family members to protect them
and hope that state courts will not behave naively if a would-be snatcher
appears. To fix this problem, states either must act in unison - by passing
the UAGPPJA and interpreting its provisions uniformly - or else Congress
must step in to protect those who badly need a preventive solution, yet
who have no voice in state courts because of their incapacity.
However, it is unclear if all 50 states will act in unison. As of early 2012,
twenty states had yet to pass the UAGPPJA, and among those that have,
it is yet to be seen whether they will all interpret the Act's provisions
See § 2361.
z See28 U.S.C. § 1652 (zoo6).
22 For example, the UAGPPJA allows for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction if there
is no home state and the state has a specific connection with the incapacitated adult. See UNIF.
ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS JURISDICTION ACT § 203 (2007). The
court is free to deny jurisdiction if it suspects foul play. Id. § 207. These provisions, read together, could be interpreted to impose a duty on a state court to investigate the circumstances
when an incapacitated adult has recently moved from his or her home state, an interpretation that certainly seems consistent with the intent of the drafters, or together they could be
interpreted as a safety valve with no real teeth unless advocates raise the issue of foul play.
The later interpretation seems to defeat the purpose of the UAGPPJA, which gives the courts
the power in preventing granny snatching. If a state court were not vigilant, it could interpret
this provision to allow anyone petitioning for guardianship over an adult who had recently
moved into the new state to argue the adult now had a specific connection, and if the state
had no procedure for other parties to intervene, there may be no way of bringing evidence of
suspicious circumstances absent court investigation. Meanwhile, a sister state could interpret
these provisions as affirmative duties on the court and thus prevent a granny snatcher, leading
to inconsistent interpretations and thus, a broken link in the otherwise "uniform" solution to
an interstate problem.
20

GRANNY SNATCHING

20II-2012]

in a similar manner. If states fail to interpret the UAGPPJA provisions
uniformly, a granny snatcher could weave his way through the cracks.
Interstate problems need cohesive solutions. Federal procedural law,
applied uniformly across all 50 states, can offer that cohesive solution to
help innocent family members caring for incapacitated relatives.
I.

GRANNY SNATCHING IN STATE COURTS

As mentioned earlier, state courts may decline to give another state's
judgment on guardianship full faith and credit. Family members may
have to either challenge a granny snatcher's guardianship or defend their
own from a granny snatcher in other state courts. Once one state finds it
has jurisdiction over the incapacitated adult, there may be little a family
member can do to stop the case, and the contempt power of the ward's home
state may not reach into other jurisdictions to prevent the granny snatcher
from filing in another court. Even if the innocent relative were successful
in fighting a granny snatcher's application for guardianship, there is still the
unnecessary cost of litigation, the trauma to the incapacitated person, and
the additional stress on the family. A federal statute could resolve several of
these key issues in granny-snatching cases.
A. Impact of the FullFaithand CreditClause
Mack v. Mack, 3 a case from Maryland, illustrates how complicated and
messy interstate guardianship proceedings can be. In Mack, the ward,
Ronald Mack, was a Maryland resident in a persistent vegetative state. 4
The Circuit Court of Baltimore County appointed the ward's wife as his
guardian, and afterward she moved to Florida."5 A year later, the ward's
wife sought appointment as her husband's guardian in the Circuit Court
of Marion County, Florida, which granted her application and discharged
her of guardianship in Maryland. 6 While Ronald was still in Maryland, his
wife inquired into removing his gastronomy tube. Ronald's father filed a
complaint in Maryland to enjoin the hospital from removing the tube and
also to be declared guardian."
The Circuit Court of Baltimore County refused to honor the Florida
court's declaration of Ronald's wife as his guardian, finding that the court
never had personal jurisdiction over Ronald."8 The court subsequently
named a temporary guardian, and Ronald's wife and father both prolonged
23 Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744 (Md. 1993).
24 See id.at 746.
25

Id.at 747.

26 Id.
27 Id.

28

ld.
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the struggle over Ronald's care through litigation over whether the Florida
decision should have been honored.
The Mack opinion does not discuss any ill will between the parties, but it
illustrates the complications that arise in modern guardianship proceedings.
In these cases, one state does not necessarily have to recognize another
state's judgment. If Mrs. Mack had access to the federal court of Maryland,
where she could bring all family members together in one suit, perhaps the
issue could have been resolved immediately instead of burdening both the
Florida and Maryland courts.
When the intentions of the parties have sinister undertones, the
procedure becomes even more clouded. For example, one state cannot
enjoin another state from hearing the case once it decides it has jurisdiction, 9
and each state has the power to decide whether it has jurisdiction over
a case.3° Therefore, family members can either try to intervene, if that
procedure is allowed, initiate a new proceeding in a different state and
hope the court will not give the first proceeding full faith and credit, or
collaterally attack the first judgment in another state court. A state court
may threaten a granny snatcher with contempt, but this penalty may or
may not be successful in deterring him once the snatcher has left the state's
jurisdiction. The following cases illustrate these problems.
B. The Limits of State Power Over SisterStates
Courts are additionally confounded by their inability to enjoin sister
states from hearing a guardianship case once the sister state court decides
it has jurisdiction. Each state has jurisdiction to decide its own jurisdiction,
and a sister state does not have the authority to prevent a state from
determining its jurisdiction.
Such was the case of In re Glasser.3 Lillian Glasser was a long-time
domiciliary of New Jersey 3 who had vacation property in Florida, the same
state where her son, Mark Glasser, lived. She also had a daughter, Suzanne
Mathews, who lived in San Antonio, Texas. 33 In February 2005, Mathews
moved her mother from her vacation home in Florida to Mathews' home in
Texas. 34 One month after moving her mother, she filed for guardianship in
Texas. 35 Her application for guardianship in Texas made no mention of her
36
mother's New Jersey connections.
29 See, e.g.,James v. Grand Truck W. R.R., 152 N.E.2d 858, 862-63 (I11. 1958).
30 See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. io6, 109-12 (1963).
31 In re Glasser, No. 209568, zoo6 WL 5too96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. March 3,2006).
32 Id. at * I.

33
34
35
36

Id. at z.
Id. at *2-3.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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In April 2005, Glasser's son filed an opposition to Mathews's appointment
in Texas courts, but he was denied.37 Glasser's nephew, Eric Smith, who
also filed an opposition, pointed to financial transactions involving Glasser's
assets that Mathews made while acting as a temporary guardian.3" The New
Jersey trial court stated that while Glasser was in Texas, several of her assets
had found their way into a family partnership;3 9 one year later, the court
entered an order listing the value of Glasser's assets as approximately $25
million. 40 Smith subsequently brought suit in New Jersey 4' and also sought
a temporary restraint in New Jersey courts against Mathews's exercise of
any guardianship authority.4 His requests were denied.
Eventually, a Texas judge appointed a guardian ad litem for Glasser. He43
then recommended she be allowed to travel to her home in New Jersey.
After she was taken home, adult protective services sought a petition
for protective services in New Jersey courts, alleging that Glasser was a
"vulnerable adult" and was being held against her will. 44 Judge Waugh, of
the New Jersey court, entered a temporary restraining order to keep all
interested parties from removing Glasser from New Jersey.4s However, in
a very suspicious timing of events, Mathews's attorney had already taken
Glasser back to Texas, allegedly before Mathews received the order, citing
concerns for Glasser's health. 46 The court could not reach into Texas's
jurisdiction nor could it prevent Texas from declaring Mathews guardian.
Back in New Jersey, Judge Waugh was left with the decision of which
court should be exerting primary jurisdiction over Glasser, who was
now suspected of being incapacitated. 47 Should it be Texas, where the
guardianship petitions were first entered (and subsequently challenged)?
Should it be New Jersey, where Glasser had lived all her life? Citing public
policy, Judge Waugh decided that comity should give way and New Jersey
would be the state of primary jurisdiction,' asking Judge Spencer in

37
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *4 (appointing counsel as guardian).
Id. at *3-4.

42

Id. at *3.

43 Id. 2t *4-5.
44 Id. at '5.
45 Id.
46 Id. at *6. Two months later, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
concluded its investigation of Mathews and her husband over allegations that they had been
physically abusing and financially exploiting Glasser. Id. at *7. They dropped their investigation after finding that there were not enough facts to support the charges. Id.
47 See id. at *7-8.
48 Id.at *i2-13.
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Texas to transfer the proceedings, should Texas law allow.49 Fortunately
for Glasser, the judges were willing to cross jurisdictions to communicate
about her case.
In a trial court order, Judge Waugh concluded that Glasser had either
Alzheimer's disease or Parkinson's or both, 0 and that Mathews had likely
exerted undue influence over her mother and her mother's estate plan.51
In fact, the judge clearly regarded Mathews's story with heavy skepticism,
saying her story was "totally unworthy of belief" because she was "clearly
acting to protect the assets for the benefit of herself and her family.""2
Glasser illustrates how equal state powers, exercised concurrently, make
granny snatching such a perplexing issue for states. Lillian Glasser was
lucky to have two judges involved in her proceeding who were willing to
cross state lines to discuss the ramifications of her case. However, it easily
could have gone the other way. All states are on equal footing with each
other in our union, so once a state court decides it has jurisdiction to hear
the case, a sister state has no power to stop the proceeding. Therefore, New
Jersey has equivalent powers of Texas, and Judge Waugh could not keep a
Texas court from hearing the case once it decided it had proper jurisdictiofi.
Had the Texas judge declined to transfer the case, Lillian Glasser would
have been left at the mercy of the Texas court and her daughter, Susan
Mathews, to watch out for her best interests. If Mathews were declared
guardian, she would have the sole voice to decide what happened to Lillian
Glasser, and she would have all $25 million of her mother's assets at her
disposal.
C. The Limits of a State's Contempt PowerAgainst Individuals
States can try to threaten a would-be snatcher with contempt if he leaves
the state's jurisdiction to flee to another sovereign state court. However, if
the granny snatcher never returns to the state and never reveals his new
location, the court may have difficulty enforcing its contempt power. In
Weissenborn v. Graham,3 the state court held a granny snatcher in contempt
after he took' his mother out of the state and across the country, never
revealing her new address. The state was left with few options to protect
the ward once she was outside the state's jurisdiction.
In Graham, an elderly Betty Pat Graham, resident of Florida, instituted
a directive to declare one of her sons, Larry, as her guardian and grant

49 Id. at* 13.
50 In re Glasser, No. 209568, 2007 WL 867783 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Mar. 8, 2007) (appointing court-appointed counsel as guardian).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Weissenborn v. Graham, 963 So. 2d 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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him broad authority over her health and property.5 4 That property totaled
$500,000 in assets, which included a home and $350,000 in a Merrill Lynch
account, the later of which disappeared sometime before litigation began.55
Graham's other son, Luke, executed a petition to have his mother
examined for competency.5 6 When the examiner concluded not only that
Graham was in fact incapacitated, but also that Luke was the son who had
his mother's best interest at heart,57 Larry moved his mother to California
without notice to the court or the parties, and thereafter refused to reveal her
whereabouts." Larry's attorney then moved to have the petition dismissed
in Florida.59 The Court summarized his attorney's reasoning: "Betty's right
to due process is being violated by the continued Florida guardianship
proceeding. The petition argues that Florida has lost jurisdiction over
Betty because she is now in California and that the Florida guardianship
proceedings must be terminated." 60
The attorney then argued that in personam jurisdiction in California
comported with "fair play and substantial justice. ' 61 The court pointed to
the original directive executed by Betty Graham, which appointed Florida
courts as the courts of competent jurisdiction, and held that Larry's actions
could not and did not divest Florida courts of jurisdiction. 62 It concluded
63
that the guardianship proceedings must take place in Florida.
Several questions go unanswered after the Graham opinion. Did Betty
Graham ever return to her home in Florida? What happened to her assets?
Did Luke ever see his mother again? The Florida opinion does not state
whether Larry instituted proceedings while in California. The Florida
court can hold Larry in contempt (and did so), 64 but it cannot prevent the
California court from trying the case.
Even though these cases illustrate uniquely interstate issues with
granny snatching - such as the limits of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
the inability to prevent co-sovereigns from exercising jurisdiction, and
the limits of the contempt power across state lines - states without the

54 Id. at 276.
55 Id. at 277.
56 Id. at 276.
57 Id. at 277 ("Larry had recently... tried to arrange for her to be moved to a lockeddown Alzheimer's ward .... The petition explained that Betty does not suffer from Alzheimer's and that Larry's purpose ... was to prevent Luke from seeing her or discovering her
whereabouts.").
58 Id.
59 Id. at 277-78.
6o Id. at 278.
6i See id. at 279.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 28o.
64 Id. at 277.
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UAGPPJA seem stuck on intrastate solutions to granny snatching. Part II
will explain how these procedures fail to address these issues because they
leave many unresolved questions, such as: What should family members
do if someone removes a relative to a state without a procedure for
intervention? What if they live in a state that does give full faith and credit
to guardianship proceedings so that the family cannot directly challenge
the judgment? Even if they can challenge the guardianship determination,
what should they do if the snatcher has already depleted the relative's assets?

II.

STATE REMEDIES FOR GRANNY SNATCHING

The most recent version of the UAGPPJA was approved in 2007 with
the goal of resolving interstate guardianship issues. 65 The Act is narrow
in scope, dealing exclusively with jurisdiction and controversies related
to jurisdiction,' its key objective is to provide a uniform definition of
67
jurisdiction for these cases.
68
Since the drafting of the UAGPPJA, thirty states have adopted it.
Some states have chosen other routes in guardianship reform instead of
adopting the UAGPPJA. Perhaps one reason is those states have concerns
about the guardianship process that they believe the UAGPPJA does not
adequately address. In 1987 the Associated Press published an expos6 of
guardianship laws, 69 which led to a call for reform focused heavily on the
due process rights of the wards in the proceeding. 0 The expos6 revealed
several substantive flaws, such as guardianship monitoring, guardianship
training, and alternatives to guardianship, that states have struggled to
resolve.71 TheAP report spurned a "flurry" of activity focusing on protecting
the elderly from abuse and finding alternatives to guardianship to protect

65 Why States Should Adopt UAGPPJA, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.nccusl.org/
Narrative.aspx?title=Why%2oStates%oShould%zoAdOpt%zoUAGPPJA (last visited Mar. 8,
2012).

66 Adult Guardianshipand Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act Summary, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.orglActSummary.aspx?title=Adult%2oGuardianship%2oand%2oProtective%2oProceedings%2oJurisdiction%zoAct (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
67 Id.
68 Uniform Adult GuardianshipandProtectiveProceedingsJurisdictionAct, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http:llwww.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Adult%2oGuardianship%2oand%2oProtective%zoProceedings%2ojurisdiction%2oAct (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
69 Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardianship:Few Safeguards, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1987, http://articles.latimes.com/1987-09-27/news/mn-I o389Iguardianship-petitions.
70 See A. Frank Johns & Vicki Joiner Bowers, GuardianshipFolly: The Afisgovernment of
Parens Patriae and the Forecastof Its Crumbling Linkage to Unprotected Older Americans in the
Twenty-First Century - A March of Folly? OrJust a Mask of Virtual Reality?, 27 STETSON L. REV.
1, 43,47-48 (1997).
71 Id.
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individual autonomy. 72
While this focus on substantive issues in the guardianship hearing
and post-guardianship monitoring is extremely important to protect
incapacitated people from abuse, it overlooks the procedural problems
that could lead to granny snatching. While the protection of the ward's
autonomy is certainly compelling, concerns with granny snatching stem
from the exploitation of an incapacitated person-whose lack of autonomy
is not questioned-through state procedural rules. For example, when
Virginia created a statute to address the due process concerns as illustrated
in the AP expose;73 its legislature was more concerned about preservation
of the ward's autonomy than it was about the procedure for initiating the
guardianship proceeding.74 Virginia's law, which requires a guardian to file
an annual report updating the court on the status of the ward, simply does
not address these procedural issues because the guardian has already been
appointed before the responsibilities to report attach. 7 Simply requiring
the guardian to file a report explaining whether the ward "agrees" with his
or her current habitation plan is a poor safeguard to prevent the guardian
from removing the ward in the first place. If the granny snatcher has gone to
such extensive lengths to secure the guardianship, surely he or she would
not then risk the guardianship by suggesting in his or her report that the
ward was unhappy with the situation.
Some states are beginning to contemplate procedural protection,
but the manner in which they are implementing such protection leaves
opportunities for would-be snatchers to forum shop.
One approach has been to look at other aspects in the state's civil
procedure and adapt them for these proceedings, such as drafting venue
provisions.7 6 But these provisions do nothing to prevent interstate granny
snatching. 77 For example, in North Carolina, which as of early 2012 had
not yet considered the adoption of the UAGPPJA, original jurisdiction is
vested with the county clerk. 78 Venue is the ultimate deciding factor of
whether the court can hear the petition for guardianship. Venue is also
broadly defined, and can exist wherever the incompetent adult resides, is
domiciled, or is an inpatient.7 9

72 Johns, supra note 8, at Io6-07.
73 See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-I021 (201 I).

74 Jamie L. Leary, Note, A Review of Two Recently Reformed GuardianshipStatutes:Balancing the Need to Protect Individuals Who Cannot Protect Themselves Against the Need to GuardIndividualAutonomy, 5 VA. J. Soc. Po'Y & L. 245, 277 (1997).
75 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-102 1 (201 I); see also Leary, supra note 74, at 279-80.
76 See Sally Balch Hurme, Crossing State Lines: Issues andSolutions in InterstateGuardianships, 37 STETSON L. REV. 87, 92-94 (2007).
77 See id.at 93--9478 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-I 103(a) (2009).
79 Id. § 35A-I 103(b).
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Interestingly, in North Carolina, if there is more than one county where
venue is proper and proceedings are brought in both, venue will be upheld
wherever the first proceeding was filed.8" In the end, the statute awards
jurisdiction to whoever reaches the courthouse first. Because the state
recognizes venue in either the case of "residence" or "domicile," someone
who removed the incompetent into the state could still argue under the
statute's language that the incompetent now "resides" in North Carolina
and venue is therefore proper. The statute gives no suggestion as to how an
interstate granny snatching case should be handled. On its face, the statue
arguably supports a snatcher's efforts by allowing for "residency" to confer
venue and thus, jurisdiction.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the inadequacy of venue provisions is
to look at a state, such as Kentucky, which employed such provisions until
its legislature adopted the UAGPPJA. Kentucky gives its district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings involving guardianship.8 Prior
to the UAGPPJA's adoption,8" if the ward were a Kentucky resident, venue
was either in the county of residence or the county of domicile.83 However,
the prior statute did not clearly define "residence." Therefore, if a granny
snatcher brought the incapacitated person into the state and then argued
Kentucky was his or her new "residence," the statute did not say whether
jurisdiction would be declined. If someone moved the incapacitated person
to another county, the statute prohibited another county district court from
hearing the case-however, if that same person were moved to another
state with a law such as Kentucky's, the court had the same conundrum.
The statute did not require the court to decline jurisdiction.
Tennessee also used to employ provisions analogous to Kentucky's
former provisions, until its legislature adopted the UAGPPJA. 8 Analysis of
how Tennessee's Court of Appeals handled a granny snatching case under
these old provisions illustrates the pressing need for a solution. Tennessee's
jurisdictional statute for appointments of conservators provided that such
actions could be brought in any probate court where there was venue,8"
and all actions shall be brought in the county of residence.86 Unfortunately,
the statute did not explicitly define "residence," so when the Tennessee
Court of Appeals was faced with an interstate granny snatcher in the case
of Salvatore v. Clayton,87 it had to decide what "residence" meant for the
8o Id. § 35A-i Io3(c).
81 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38 7 .520(1) (West 2oo6 &West Supp. 2o i).
82 Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, ch. 47, 201
Ky.Acts 184 (2011) (as codified at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.81o (West Supp. 2ol0).
83 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.520(2)(a)-(b) (West 2oo6 & Supp. 201 1).
84 See TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 34-8-203

(Supp. zoo).

85 Id. § 34-3-101(a).
86 Id.§ 34-3-1oi(b).
87 Salvatore v. Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
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probate court's dismissal of a petition for
statute to determine whether 8the
8
guardianship was appropriate.
In Salvatore,the ward, Lois G. Clayton, was an Alzheimer's patient and
long-time resident of Florida.8 9 She had been declared incompetent, and her
stepdaughter, who also lived in Florida, became her guardian,' Afterward,
Clayton was admitted to a nursing home in North Carolina. Her son, a
resident of Tennessee, removed her from the nursing home and took her
91
to Rutherford County, Tennessee, where he filed a conservator petition.
The probate court initially appointed him conservator and ordered him to
intervene in the guardianship proceeding in Florida. 92 When his stepsister
subsequently intervened in the Tennessee action, she cited Tennessee's
jurisdictional statute in her motion to dismiss. The probate court dismissed
the action. 93
When Clayton appealed, he argued that his mother was residing in
Tennessee and therefore jurisdiction and venue were proper.94 The Court
concluded that the statute made venue "jurisdictional;" therefore, if
the ward was not a resident, there was no jurisdiction-but that left the
problem of what "resident" meant for the statute. 9 The Court recognized
that resident could either mean a place of abode-the usual, ordinary
meaning-or it could be more synonymous with "domicile."' The
legislative history provided no help, so the court decided to look at the
purpose of these proceedings to determine what "resident" should meanthe purpose of a guardianship proceeding, it concluded, was to "protect
the person and property of a disabled person." 97 The Court also concluded
that the best source of protection was the court system itself. Because the
courts of the person's domicile will likely have stronger ties to the person
and thus be better able to protect them, the meaning of "resident" must
be more analogous to "domicile." 98 The Court also pointed out that other
jurisdictions construing other statutes similar to Tennessee's have equated
88 Id. at 89-91.
89 Id. at 87.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 88.
92

Id.

93 Id.
94 Id. at 89.
95 Id. This issue is why the UAGPPJA refrained from the term "resident" or "domicile" and instead gave a duration of time-the type of vagueness with which the Tennessee
Court wrestled only exacerbates the problem and gives more wiggle room for a clever granny
snatcher. See UNIF. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS JURISDICTION ACT
§§ zoi(a)(2)-(3), 203 cmt. (2007), available at http://www.guardianship.org/spotlight/UAGPPJAFinalDec07.pdf.
96 Salvatore, 914 S.W.2d at 89.
97 Id. at 90.
98 Id. at 9o-91.
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"residence" with "domicile.""
While perhaps the Court was correct that Tennessee must have meant
"domicile" when it said "resident," and perhaps it was also right that
the purpose of the statute is to protect incapacitated persons, the Court
could not deny that these terms' common meaning have different legal
significance.10° Presumably, the Tennessee legislature was aware of these
distinctions, and if it wanted venue established in the same place as the
party's "domicile," it could have said so. The Court was arguably more
concerned about the ramifications of holding jurisdiction proper in this
case, and admits as much in the opinion:
Approving Mr. Clayton's conduct in this case would set an
unfortunate precedent for future cases. Intra-family hostility
is disruptive and inimical to a disabled person's best interests.
Granting Mr. Clayton's petition in light of his conduct, no matter
how well-motivated, would signal this court's approval of this
type of behavior. 'll
The probate court must have thought Clayton was a resident and
therefore jurisdiction was proper; it was not until the sister's appearance
that the Court even questioned this assumption. The Court could have just
as easily concluded that "resident" means the common meaning-place of
abode. The fact that the Court felt compelled to interpret the statute this
way highlights the problem with venue provisions as a solution to interstate
guardianship issues.
As pointed out by Sally Bach Hurme, an attorney who has spent the
past nineteen years working for the AARP studying various elder law
issues,'02 venue provisions are an odd solution to this interstate problem." 3
While venue provisions may help find the most convenient forum, they
are a bad fit for the complicated problem of interstate granny snatching.
Venue provisions attempt an intrastate solution, focusing on which court
within the state is proper to hear the case; this does little to discourage a
kidnapper from taking the person into that state in the first place. Granny
snatching needs a preventive solution to protect vulnerable people from
greedy intentions of would-be guardians. That requires a solution that
looks outward, using procedures that transcend state lines, not procedures
such as venue that only point inward.
Another option for states to address granny snatching is through reform
of the probate courts, such as through the adoption of uniform probate

99 Id. at 91.
ioo See Mas v. Perry, 489 E2d 1396, 1399 (5 th Cir. 1974).
1i Salvatore, 914 S.W.2d at 91-92.
1o2

Biography of Sally Hurme, STETSON L.

content/shurme.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
103 See Hurme, supra note 76, at 97-98.

REV.,

http://elder.law stetson.edu/professional/
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standards." ° Perhaps this is because probate courts theoretically have
more expertise with guardianship proceedings and, if following uniform
standards, would be quicker to spot a possible granny snatching case. One
example of a state that adopted uniform standards for its probate courts
5
is Arizona, which adopted the Uniform Probate Code."' Arizona, like
°
Tennessee, also recently adopted the UAGPPJA.' However, analysis of
the UPC's definition of jurisdiction shows why the UPC is insufficient to
resolve the problem of granny snatching.
The UPC simply does not address the principal concern in granny
snatching cases-deterring granny snatchers from removing the
incapacitated person from his or her home state. The probate code demands
several pieces of information from a petitioner for guardianship, including
a general statement of the incapacitated person's property,107 names and
addresses of the incapacitated person,' any conservators'0 9 (guardians),
nearest relative"0° and the person who seeks appointment."' However,
the code, as adopted by Arizona, defines jurisdiction in terms of venue,
specifying that venue exists "where the incapacitated person resides or is
present.""' In adopting this code, the state specifically cited uniformity as
a goal). 13 The irony is that the code therefore uniformly defines jurisdiction
in a similar manner as Tennessee did in Salvatore,4 which left that state
completely unprepared for a granny snatching case."
In summation, each sovereign state can draft or adopt whatever laws it
thinks best to protect its citizens from any nationwide problem, but that
also means potentially fifty answers to the same issue. If the guardianship
proceeding involves entirely local parties and assets, there is no reason
to believe that the states cannot legislate effectively to protect the ward
through the proceeding. But each state cannot control the decisions of
its sister states; should a sister state decline to extend extra procedural
protections, there is nothing the ward's home state could do to stop the
sister state's courts from the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the

1o4 Id.at 99.
105 See Uniform Commercial Code Locator: Probate Code Locator, LEGAL INFO. INSTIT., http:l
www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
Io6 See Uniform Adult GuardianshipandProtcive Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Adult%2oGuardianship%Zoand%20
Protective%zoProceedings%2Jurisdiction%oAct (last visited Mar. 5,2012).
107 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14 -53o3(B)(6) (2005).
Io8 Id. § 14-5303(B)(2).
109 Id. § I4-5303(B)(4).
I50 Id. § I4-5303(B)(5).
III Id. § I4-5303(B)(3).
112 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § I4-5302 (2oo6) (emphasis added).
113 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § I4-I102(B)(5) (zoo6).
114 See Salvatore v. Clayton, 914 S.W 2d 84, 87-89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
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incapacitated person.
III.

CREATING A NEW STATUTORY INTERPLEADER

Interstate problems need interstate solutions. Co-sovereign states
cannot police each other, and once a sovereign state decides it has
jurisdiction over a guardianship proceeding, there could be little another
state can do, as illustrated in the Glassercase. The ward may be unable
to speak for himself and once removed to another state, his relatives may
not be able to intervene in state proceedings. Thus, the status of both his
welfare and his assets may depend entirely on one court's judgment. A
federal interpleader statute would circumvent these problems by allowing
parties access to the federal courts where they can join all interested parties
into the same suit. Such an interpleader should adopt definitions of personal
jurisdiction borrowed from the UAGPPJA so as to protect the incapacitated
relative, and then it should give the courts the power to enjoin any other
parties from bringing such proceedings concurrently in state courts.
A. Applying interpleaderrules to a guardianshipproceeding
Statutory interpleader"5 vests original jurisdiction in federal courts if
at least one adverse party is diverse from another adverse party,1' 6 and the
parties have an amount in controversy of at least $500.17 The statute allows
several parties, all of whom have similar claims to a piece of property that
cannot be divided, to adjudicate all claims at the same time and save them
from duplicitous litigation.
Interpleader is frequently used in disputes involving multiple claimants
to one insurance policy, on the grounds that one suit for all claimants
conserves judicial resources and protects the defendant, who has limited
funds, from having to defend multiple suits." 8 It also can protect the
stakeholders, in that without such a joinder rule, one stakeholder may have
to challenge the validity of a judgment in favor of an adversarial stakeholder.
This can be especially hard if the defendant has a limited policy and has
already exhausted the policy to satisfy that separate judgment. Therefore,
the best solution is to bring all claimants to an insurance policy, just like
applicants for guardianship, together in an interpleader action. Then the
court can weigh the parties' evidence and decide who is best entitled to the
policy, just as the court in a guardianship proceeding must decide who has
the ward's best intentions at heart.
Just as the res in an interpleader cannot be divided, guardianship over
115 See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2006) (detailing the requirements of interpleader).
116 28 U.S.C. §§ 13 3 2(d)(2), 1335(a)(1) (2oo6).
117 § 1335(a).

118 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523,533 (1967).
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an incapacitated person and his assets cannot logistically be split between
adversarial "stakeholders." A family member seeking to protect the aging
relative may face the same conundrum as a claimant to a limited insurance
policy, wherein he would have to challenge the validity of another state's
decision in favor of an adversary before re-litigating the case himself. Even
if the relative were successful in challenging the state's judgment, there is
still the risk that the relative's adversary would have already depleted the
ward's accounts, sold off his assets, and possibly even committed the ward
to a nursing facility-just like a limited insurance policy that is already
"cashed out."
The courts additionally serve a protective function in the current
interpleader by keeping the disputed res within the court's control.119 In the
same manner, an incapacitated person and his assets could be kept safely
away from any greedy relatives while the court controls the incapacitated
person's care. A federal interpleader would thus remove many of the issues
facing state courts and offer several substantive benefits to concerned
families.
First, this Note will explain how the federal court could obtain both
constitutional and statutory jurisdiction over a granny snatching case, as
this would be a prerequisite for any effective solution that involves federal
courts. Next, this Note will explain the specific substantive provisions of
this joinder rule that are necessary for an effective solution.
1. Jurisdictional Aspects.-First, granny-snatching cases must involve
parties from different states. If the parties are all domiciled within the same
state and never take the subject of the lawsuit outside the state, there is
no granny snatching issue-no one has robbed the ward of the benefits of
personal jurisdiction in his or her home state. It is only when interested
parties are diverse from each other and have the power to remove the aging
adult to their home state's courts that concerns about granny snatching arise.
Therefore, the constitutional power to create a new statutory interpleader
would arise under the Diversity Clause.'2 0 Diversity will always be present
in granny snatching cases and the statute can mirror the minimal diversity
present in the current statutory interpleader.
Second, the amount in controversy, should Congress choose to require
one, would easily be $500 or more in any claim for guardianship,' Once
declared guardian, all control over the ward's care and property is placed in
the guardian's hands."22 Therefore, because the control of property is part
of what will be decided in the case, Congress should define the amount in
119 § 1335(a)(2).
120 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, c1. i.

121 This figure is borrowed from the amount in controversy mentioned in the current
interpleader. § 1335(a).
122 See Johns, supra note 8, at 37.
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controversy to include the value of the incapacitated person's assets.
Generally in granny snatching cases, we presume the motivation to
move the ward comes from a desire to control the ward's highly valuable
assets. To strike a fair balance between the need to protect these
incapacitated persons and limit the caseload of federal courts, Congress
should increase this requirement to a higher dollar amount, perhaps even
the minimal amount for a usual diversity claim of $75,000.13 This would
focus the courts' resources on the cases that are the primary suspects for
granny snatching, while also limiting the amount of additional cases that
will appear before an already burdened court system. If instead Congress
chose to borrow the amount in controversy from the current interpleader, it
should be easy for most cases to meet that threshold. Even if the ward has
no property at the time of guardianship, the cost of care for the ward could
easily exceed $500. For example, the average cost of a home health aide
for an Alzheimer's patient is $21 an hour,2 4 and the average annual cost of
15
nursing home care is $50,000 and climbing.
2. Substantiveprovisions.-The current interpleader statute also provides
for two critical elements in preventing a granny snatching case. First, it
provides for nationwide service of process."2 6 Family members can be
spread across the nation, so a successful interpleader solution must have
a way to serve each relative with process so as to bring all interested
parties into the action. It would be strange indeed to offer interpleader as
a solution and then for the courts to be unable to serve process on the one
devious relative that the other family members suspect.
Second, interpleader allows the party seeking original jurisdiction in
federal court to enjoin other parties from bringing actions in state courts."2 7
This provision is critical, because otherwise there is no incentive for a
potential granny snatcher to continue as a party to a federal lawsuit. Without
this provision, the granny snatcher could begin a state court proceeding
concurrently with the federal interpleader. If the provision were added,
it would allow the federal court to hold the snatcher in contempt, and
because federal jurisdiction reaches across all states, it could enforce its
power on the granny snatcher in whichever state the snatcher chose to file
the competing suit.
Admittedly, if someone were underhanded enough to consider removing
an incapacitated relative to another state, that person may also be devious
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2oo6).
124 The Facts on Alzheimer's Disease, AM. HEALTH AsSISTANCE FOUND., http://www.ahaf.org/
alzheimers/about/understanding/facts.html (last updated Sept. 26, 201 i).
125 Nursing Homes: Cost and Coverage, AARP.ORG, available at http://assets.aarp.org/external-sites/cargiving/nursing.home-costs.html (last visited Mar. 8, 20I2).
iz6 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2006).
127 Id.
123 28
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enough to defy a contempt order and file a concurrent state action. If he
did, there is the possibility that the state proceeding could conclude before
the federal proceeding and the snatcher would have an enforceable state
judgment. The federal court is normally obligated to-respect the state court
judgment, because even though there is no constitutional equivalent of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause that requires federal recognition of state court
judgments, the Full Faith and Credit Statute l"8 requires federal courts to
give state courts comity."1 9Congress must be prepared to protect the federal
courts' judgments in these cases by clearly stating in this new interpleader
statute that the presumption of section 1738 that state court adjudications
be given full faith and credit is not intended to apply,13 and that any state
judgment that conflicts with a federal judgment on this issue will not be
entitled to preclusion. 3' Such an addition to the proposed statute would
not interfere with any final state judgments decided prior to the beginning
of the federal court's jurisdiction, and would be the only way to protect all
claimants from a party who would rather be held in contempt than give up
3
his opportunity for guardianship.
Therefore, Congress must also explicitly say in this new statutory
interpleader that the full faith and credit statute does not apply if a state
proceeding concludes before thefederal proceeding. Congress also must be
clear in the statute that states should not infer the opposite effect, i.e. that
states are not obligated to respect valid, final federal judgments. 133 This
would ensure that if a party ignores the injunction after an interpleader
action is filed, then the state's judgment would not receive full faith and
credit in federal court, while ensuring that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
still obligates the states to respect a federal judgment.
A final federal judgment should also be entitled to preclusive effect
over any contrary state judgment, entered while federal courts had
jurisdiction over the case, within that state's jurisdiction. The Supremacy
Clause' 34 states that federal law stands supreme over any state law in
1z8 z8 U.S.C. § 1738 (2oo6).
129 See Matushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, S16 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1996) (holding
that where a state has subject matter jurisdiction, § 1738 requires a federal court to give the
state court judgment full faith and credit).
o
130 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 9 , 99 (1980); see also Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461,468-70 (1982).
r-31 See Allen, 449 U.S. at 99.
132 See, e.g., Weissenborn v. Graham, 963 So. 2d 275, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (detailing one guardian's willingness to be held in contempt rather than forfeit guardianship rights).
133 The Supreme Court has previously held that the Full Faith and Credit Statute applies to state recognition of federal judgments. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938)
("Under [the Full Faith and Credit Statute,] the judgments and decrees of the Federal courts
in a state are declared to have the same dignity in the courts of that state as those of its own
courts in a like case and under similar circumstances.")
134 U.S. CONsT. art. VI., cl. z.
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conflict and thus provides federal courts with the constitutional power to
protect its judgments. 35 The federal court also has the power to enjoin a
state proceeding 3 6 once an interpleader action has been filed. The AntiInjunction Act, which otherwise prohibits federal courts from enjoining
actions in state courts,'37 would not apply because the Act provides an
exception for any enforcement necessary "to protect or effectuate its
judgments."' 38 Section 2361 expressly authorizes a federal court in any
interpleader to enjoin parties while also allowing the court to make the
injunction permanent and make "all appropriate orders to enforce its
judgment."' 139 Any state judgment would be in violation of the injunction
and thus should not be entitled to preclude a valid federal judgment within
40
the state's jurisdiction.
135 See, e.g., Miss. Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 E Supp. 1, 14 (1967) ("It is
well settled that the courts of the United States have the inherent and statutory (28 USCA §
1651) power and authority to enter such orders as may be necessary to enforce and effectuate
their lawful orders and judgments, and to prevent them from being thwarted and interfered
with by force, guile, or otherwise."); see also Allan D. Vestal, Protectinga FederalCourt Judgment, 42 TENN. L. REv. 635, 639 (1975) ("When an attempt is made in state court to relitigate a
claim or issue previously adjudicated by a federal court, statutory full faith and credit, federal
supremacy, and comity all suggest that the federal judgment must be protected.")
136 Enjoining the litigants is the same as enjoining the proceeding. In fact, the Supreme
Court has held that enjoining the litigants does not circumvent the Anti-Injunction Act, e.g.
Okla. Packing Co. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940) ("That the injunction was a
restraint of the parties and was not formally directed against the state court itself is immaterial.")
137 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2oo6).
138 Id. § 2283. Admittedly, the abstention doctrine is a separate bar that the federal court
must overcome. Younger would be the immediate obstacle. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(97 1). However, civil applications of Younger abstention are simply inapplicable here, as these
guardianship proceedings are in no way akin to criminal proceedings. See Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,604 (975) ("The component of Younger which rests upon the threat to our
federal system is thus applicable to a civil proceeding such as this quite as much as it is to a
criminal proceeding.... Strictly speaking, this element of Younger is not available to mandate
federal restraint in civil cases. But ... we deal here with a state proceeding which in important
respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases.")
139 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2oo6); see also O'Daniel v. Porter, 240 Ezd 636,637 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
("Federal courts have the power to enjoin state court proceedings affecting the subject matter
involved in an action under the Federal Interpleader Act.")
14o The preclusive effect of the federal judgment is complicated by the fact that
jurisdiction is based on diversity. This creates complex Erie problems-is res judicata a
question of state law or federal law? In Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497,
508 (zoo0), the Supreme Court held that the preclusive effect of a dismissal is determined by
federal common law. Then the Court decided that federal common law would not need to be
uniform, and in that case, it should be based on the law of the forum state. Id. However, that
would not be the case if state law were incompatible with federal interests. Id. at 509. Simply
put, answering this question is simply beyond the scope of this Note. In the end, whether
the forum court determines to borrow federal or state law in deciding the preclusive effect of
the judgment will likely come down to good advocacy-a skilled advocate representing the
family of an incapacitated relative must be ready to argue that the state's interest is either
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Thus, with the combined threats of contempt and the federal court's
lack of comity for a state proceeding, the would-be granny snatcher would
have a greatly reduced incentive to defy the court order and adjudicate in
state court.
Once the skeleton of the statute is built, the essence of its purposedefining personal jurisdiction so as to prevent granny snatching-is next.
The exercise of personal jurisdiction is the easy part. Serving a summons on
someone who is subject to the forum state's general jurisdiction establishes
personal jurisdiction in the federal courts, 14 and if someone is present in
the state, a court can exercise general personal jurisdiction over him without
violating federal due process. 14 However, the real concern in these cases is
preventing the exercise of jurisdiction by those who remove incapacitated
persons to the forum state just so they can adjudicate the case while they
are present. Eliminating that problem requires much narrower definitions
of personal jurisdiction to protect the incapacitated; Congress need look
no further than the definitions for personal jurisdiction in the UAGPPJA,
specifically the definitions for "home state" (where the individual has been
present for at least six months) 143 and "specific connection state" (meaning
some connection other than just mere presence.) 14 Therefore, as per the
statute's definitions of personal jurisdiction, the federal court sitting in the
ward's home state would also be the exclusive federal court with the power
to exercise personal jurisdiction over the incapacitated adult. If there were
no home state, the federal court sitting in the ward's specific-connection
state would exercise jurisdiction. Defining personal jurisdiction in such a
strict way ensures that the case is heard in the state that offers the best
evidence of the ward's wishes and the party's intentions. By making the
action an interpleader, it would force all claimants into the litigation,
placing the burden on each party to make the best case and allowing an
impartial adjudicator to decide amongst them all.
CONCLUSION

If such a statute existed, perhaps some of the anguish and expense
that the families in the Glasser and Graham cases faced could have been
avoided. In the Glasser case, the cost of the Texas litigation alone, at the
145
time of Waugh's opinion on primary jurisdiction, exceeded $1.5 million.
more procedural (law of the forum court applies) or more substantive (law of the forum state
applies).
4i FED. R. Clv. P 4(k)(i)(A).
I42 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (i877).
143 UNIF. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS JURISDICTION ACT § 203
(2007).

144 Id.
145 In re Glasser, No. 2o9568, 2oo6 WL 5ioo96, at *I(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Mar. 3,
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An interpleader could have saved not only extensive costs in litigation
but also protected Glasser from multiple moves between states and
allowed her to stay at home, where she wanted to be in the first place. 1"
Most importantly, an interpleader could have removed the incentive for
Mathews to manipulate state law. Perhaps if Mathews knew that not only
would the federal proceeding be given preclusive effect, but that she also
could be held in contempt, her incentive to use the state court would have
disintegrated.
In Weissenborn v. Graham, Luke could have sued for guardianship in
Florida federal courts and forced Larry, then living in California, to litigate
in Florida. As a result, Larry would lose the incentive to remove his mother
from her home. Any state litigation would be a waste of money, and if money
were his motivation in the first place, he would probably be disinclined to
move her out of state.
Interstate guardianship involves issues of the ward's safety, property,
liberty and welfare, and in such cases exercise of traditional in personam
jurisdiction contorts all notions of "fair play and substantial justice." 147 The
UAGPPJA has offered definitions of personal jurisdiction to bottleneck
those who would abuse the system to exploit incapacitated persons-but
if not all states adopt these definitions, it leaves the door open for potential
granny snatchers to forum shop.
If Congress creates a federal statute to provide for original subject matter
jurisdiction in the federal courts, using the strict definitions of personal
jurisdiction provided in the UAGPPJA, then families of incapacitated
persons like Ms. Graham and Ms. Glasser will have their much-needed
solution. Meanwhile, each state remains free to define whatever substantive
law it feels should apply in these cases.
This Note does not intend to suggest that the entirety of guardianship
law should become part of the federal domain. This Note concerns one
group: those who have relatives dispersed throughout the country who
are clearly incapacitated and in need of guardianship, and therefore easily
exploitable. State procedural law could be used to gerrymander jurisdiction
over their cases, and then each state's courts could encounter the same
problem faced in Glasser.' whose state court proceeding is entitled to
preclusive effect? What happens if each state court finds that its judgment
should be so entitled?
These incapacitated people are entitled to have one judgment, binding
on all interested parties, so that they do not have to face duplicitous
litigation. They are entitled to remain at home while their guardianship
proceeding is heard. They are also entitled to keep possession of all their
2oo6).
146 Id. at *4-5.

147 Int'l Shoe v.Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 36 (1945); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714.
148 See Inre Glasser,No. 209568 at *8,
*11, *13.
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assets, at least until the court appoints the best guardian. Therefore, a
federal interpleader designed for such cases is a completely appropriate
exercise of protective jurisdiction.
The only way to fully protect our most vulnerable citizens is to provide
families with one trial that hears each relative's best case, and effectively
precludes any motivation for one relative to move an incapacitated person
away from home.

